Miss Frothingham's version seems to us excellent; it reads easily, and at the same time has much of the conciseness and point of the original. With a good deal of searching we have been able to find a few passages which seem to need correction. On p. x, of the Preface, *Afterkritik* is "spurious," rather than "faultfinding," criticism. P. xi, "savor more of the *fountain*" hardly translates "*mehr nach der Quelle schmecken*"; "fountain-*head*" would perhaps answer. On p. 109, the first sentence needs revision in order to make it English. On p. 124, the last sentence should read, "My opinion is that true perspective in pictures was hit upon incidentally through scene-painting; but even when that art was already in its perfection it must still have been no easy task to apply its rules to a single plane," etc. On p. 171, "*argutiæ*" is rather "subtilties of detail" than "traits of animation." P. 183, the "Borghese Gladiator" is better known as the "Fighting Gladiator"; and at this place it might be mentioned that Lessing afterwards withdrew the conjecture (for once not a very happy one) that it was a statue of Chabrias.

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12. — *The Constitutional History of England in its Origin and Development.* By WILLIAM STUBBS, M. A., Regius Professor of Modern History. Vol. I. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press. 1874.

THE authority of Professor Stubbs deservedly stands so high, that a critic who undertakes to deal with his works must always feel the task to be one of no little difficulty and danger. His name has often been mentioned in the pages of this Review, and always with respect and praise. He is not only learned and accurate, but, unlike some of his rivals in the same field, his judgment is admirable, and his caution almost excessive. As Regius Professor at Oxford, he gives dignity to the study of history. Even yet this study stands at that University in comparatively slight esteem, overshadowed as it still is by the prescriptive authority of the classics; and the present work is doubly valuable if it is an evidence that Oxford intends at last to interest herself seriously in the history of England, and to tolerate no longer that indifference which has thus far left the national annals in the hands of Scotchmen or amateurs. A scientific training is as necessary to the historian as to the mathematician, and it is the misfortune of England that she has never yet had a scientific historical school.

Mr. Stubbs's first volume deals with the constitutional history of England during the long period of seven centuries between the first

establishment of the Germans and the adoption of Magna Charta. There is no use in disguising the fact that, to the mass of readers, early English history is dull reading, and early English constitutional history is peculiarly dull reading. Yet its scientific interest is very great. The constitutional changes which marked these seven centuries were more radical than any which have occurred since their close. They include the entire conversion of an archaic, pagan community into a nation which was only waiting for the masterly touch of Edward I. to become a model in history. The various stages of this preliminary progress; the obscure forms of society and law, with their irritating and pedantic details; the experiments in government which succeeded, or, still worse, those that failed; the incessant and always intricate struggle between the old that was passing away and the new that was at hand; — all these changes and varieties of the story require a profound treatment and consume infinite time. That Professor Stubbs should have succeeded in compressing this part of his subject into only six hundred pages is to be explained by his careful exclusion of all extended argument, and his moderation in the display of learning. He has produced a work which for compactness and solidity can be compared with nothing but a dictionary. A different arrangement or a careful index might easily convert it into a sort of English Ducange. And although Mr. Stubbs's History is far in advance of any previous work of the kind, and will probably long retain its superiority over all rivals, still the critic may be allowed to express a regret that the author, instead of writing a history, did not rather compile a glossary like that of Ducange or Spelman. Experience has proved that such immortality as the antiquarian can ever expect is best to be earned in this manner. Even the best histories are soon superseded and cease to be read; but Ducange, Spelman, Grimm, must always be consulted and re-edited. Professor Stubbs could propose for himself no task so brilliant or so useful as that of furnishing the world with a complete index and glossary to all the records of early English history. How valuable such a work may be has been shown by Dr. Schmid, who has done it for the laws alone. There are no books so essential to the student and so little accessible in English history as this sort of cyclopædia. There are none which bar so effectually the influence of dangerous or feeble theorizing, or which tend so directly to shorten the labor of good historians.

There is another reason why this method of proceeding would have been especially suitable in the present case. Without the slightest disrespect to Professor Stubbs, who stands above the range

of captious criticism, even his strongest friends must concede that his mind is better adapted to the work of compilation than to the art of story-telling. The historian must be an artist. He must know how to develop the leading ideas of the subject he has chosen, how to keep the thread of his narrative always in hand, how to subordinate details, and how to accentuate principles. But of such an art Mr. Stubbs is altogether innocent. He would perhaps regard it as slightly contemptible, and, indeed, in England it has really become so, although, strange to say, in Germany it has been of late superbly developed. Mr. Stubbs has no theories to advance, no principle to demonstrate. His History aims at the correct appreciation of facts, so far as they are at hand, rather than at the development of an idea. He is a perfect editor; he would be an admirable lexicographer; but as an historian he will infallibly be voted dull.

This is the more to be regretted because there is no reason nor excuse for it in the subject itself. The mass of mankind, of course, will always think constitutional history dull, but Mr. Stubbs does not write for the mass of mankind. He writes for a small class of lawyers or students who are peculiarly interested in the subject, and fully alive to its extreme importance. To them the constitutional history of England is perhaps the most interesting history that ever was written. England offers to them the spectacle of a nation which has passed through all the stages of change both in public and private law, from pure archaism down to the latest germs of future institutions now struggling into life, either in her own soil or that of her offshoots, and in all this mass of public and private law it can hardly be said that there is a single serious interruption of legal continuity. She is therefore a curiosity among nations, unique in her development. Rome can alone claim a rivalry with her, but at least on the political side England has an indisputable advantage over Rome.

So far as private law is concerned, the early history of this great system is still almost a blank. Neither Mr. Stubbs nor any other writer has seriously attempted it, and it is destined to remain untouched until Germany has forced England into scholarship. All that is known of early English private law must as yet be read in German books. Until the appearance of Mr. Stubbs's work, this was also very much the case in regard to constitutional law; the excellent books of Kemble and Palgrave were becoming antiquated. Mr. Stubbs, however, is a German scholar, and is not ashamed of acknowledging his indebtedness to Germany. Yet it is safe to say that even Mr. Stubbs might have gone with advantage still more

deeply into the study of German historians in the more technical branches of private law. Nevertheless, a great point has been gained by the general concession that English constitutional history begins with the coming of the Germans in the latter half of the fifth century, and Mr. Stubbs has done much to clear men's minds by rejecting at the outset every suggestion of Roman influence, and resting his whole structure upon the simple foundation of German archaic society.

The outlines of this society, thanks to German investigators, are now sufficiently clear. The Angles and Saxons who drove out the old British population brought to England a constitution of their own. In Germany they had adopted, before the earliest historical period, an organization which bore the name of *hundred;* and although the term itself does not appear in their laws till a much later period, Mr. Stubbs admits that the earliest Anglo-Saxon society was probably founded upon this division or its equivalent. They lived in small settlements where the land was, perhaps, held in common, or where, at all events, there were extensive rights of common, but their constitutional activity centred in the hundred, of which the village or community was but a fraction. The hundred was their unit of organization. At the hundred court, the mallus, methel, or thing, which met every month, each freeman was probably bound to appear. The legal procedure peculiar to this court was certainly in essentials the same as that described in the Lex Salica as existing among the Franks at the same period, and has already been sketched at considerable length in this Review. Perhaps at the beginning, when the German settlements were very small, the hundred court was parliament and law-court in one, and all questions of every kind may have been settled there under the presidency of the ealdorman. But as larger districts were occupied, the hundreds appear to have been grouped together in shires, and twice a year the freemen met together at a fixed spot and transacted business both legal and political in the shire-court, which had an appellate jurisdiction in all suits, and was probably presided over by the ealdorman.

Thus the early constitution was simple enough. It was purely democratic. The ealdorman was a president whose powers were no greater than the freemen chose to concede. The free citizens administered their own law and their own political system in their own courts. They went out to war as they went to their hundred-court; law-court, parliament, and army were the same. If any reliance is to be placed in the general characteristics of German society, these or similar institutions must have existed in all the numerous shires which are called kingdoms in the early history.

In regard to this period, however, the records are very vague, and results are not easily fixed beyond dispute. Nearly four centuries elapsed after the Germans first settled in England before any clear notion of their government can be obtained from their literature. During that time a whole civilization had spread over Europe under the Frankish empire, and had introduced a characteristic constitutional system. England was strongly influenced by it. Of that system the elevation of royal authority, and the administration of the hundreds by royal officials, were marked incidents. It is, therefore, natural enough that a law of Edward the Elder, of about the year 920, should direct his reeves to hold their court every four weeks. The royal sheriff presided therefore in the hundred-court. To this extent administration had been centralized. England was now united under one king, and a great council assisted in the political government. Later times have given to this body the name of Witenagemot, or court of the elders; in Anglo-Saxon days it seems to have been known as merely the Witan or the Gemot.

Here, then, begins the division of English constitutional history into its two main branches, the political and the judicial. Omitting all else in order to keep these great objects clearly in view, the single point of special interest in regard to the first must be to ascertain how far the Witan is to be considered as identical with the later Parliament. On this subject the English historians are rarely to be trusted. They are apt to be led, by a sentiment of patriotism, into the assertion as an article of faith of what is not only incapable of proof, but inconsistent with facts. Even Mr. Stubbs, cautious as he is, allows himself to dwell rather on the points of resemblance than on the differences between the two assemblies. The great German historian, Sohm, has described more clearly than Professor Stubbs has done the peculiarities of the Anglo-Saxon political system. These peculiarities rest mainly on the fact that in England the ealdormen represent the old tribal independence, the petty kings who preceded the national union. Their authority was not created by the throne, but was older than the throne. What the crown won, it won from the ealdorman. He was a viceking, with an authority not derived from, but independent of, the king. No law of the king's, but a principle of the constitution, defined the plenitude of his power. Not the will of the king alone, but a judicial sentence, could deprive him of his office. The ealdorman excluded the king from the immediate government of his province. Local government was therefore the rule, not of the king, but of the ealdorman. The king, in appointing him, appointed not a servant of his will, but a prince and lord of the province.

In the Witan the king and the Church alone represented the principle of national unity and the tendency to centralization. The ealdormen represented an antagonistic force, the ancient constitutional rights of local independence. How strong this principle was, can best be seen in the lives of Aelfric and Eadric Streona. It made the kingdom a prey to internal treachery and foreign conquest. It was the natural forerunner of a feudal chaos; and when Harold, imitating the Capetians, raised himself to the throne, the natural consequence would seem to have been that England should share the fate of France.

To have prevented this was the one great service which William the Norman rendered to mankind. His crown depended upon success in trampling the last spark of life out of that local aristocracy, descended from the heptarchy, which found its expression in the Witan. Nor is there any other single point in William's policy which stands out in equal prominence with this. Here is the justification of his course in making Northumbria a desert, and in cutting off Waltheof's head. To guard against any possible revival of the old system, he scattered his grants to the Norman nobles over all England, nowhere allowing the revival of a local aristocracy. His policy was wise and successful, however rough it may have been. Never again after William's reign does one hear of Wessex, of Mercia, or of a Northumbrian Witan.

As a necessary consequence of this policy, the old Anglo-Saxon Witena-gemot perished with the class it represented, nor is this result in the least affected by the fact that the conqueror maintained for a time a certain hollow form which still bore its name. It is even made more conspicuous by the fact, pointed out by Mr. Stubbs, that the judicial powers of the Witan were henceforward wielded by the Curia Regis, which thus acquired a prominence hitherto denied it. Neither Mr. Stubbs nor even Mr. Freeman would probably maintain that there is any evidence whatever to establish the existence of a legislative assembly under Rufus, Henry I., Stephen, Henry II., Richard or John. The utmost that can be demonstrated is the occasional indication of a consultative body, which, to say the least, has no stronger affiliations with the Witan than it has with the Curia Regis or the Norman court of the barons. Two whole centuries elapsed between the last genuine meeting of the Witan and the first meeting of Parliament. When at length the practical wisdom of the English mind and the administrative genius of Edward I. organized parliamentary government, the constitution of that body was essentially the opposite to that of the Witan. It was national, it was representative, it was popular. The Witan had been sectional, self-constituted, aris-

tocratic. The Witan represented the heptarchy, Parliament the consolidated nation. The Witan perpetuated all that was worst in the old system: Parliament offered all that was best in the new. The Witan, as an experiment in constitutional government, had never worked easily or thoroughly; it was a failure. Parliament was from the first a success. There is little in common between them, except that both were legislative and judicial assemblies.

If Mr. Stubbs's caution has prevented him from advancing any very strong or very peculiar views in regard to the logical sequence of English political institutions, the same cause is possibly accountable for his failure to mark sharply what he would consider the essential elements in the judicial constitution. His description is confused by details. He begins, too, by a statement which is hardly tenable: "The unit of the constitutional machinery [in early Anglo-Saxon times] is the township, the *villata* or *vicus*." If he had said that the unit was the shire, the statement would have had grounds of support. If he had said it was the hundred, he would have agreed with the highest modern authorities. If he had called it the tithing, or the family, an argument might have been made in his favor. But one is at a loss to understand in what single particular the *villata* or township was a unit of constitutional machinery. It had not a single constitutional function of any kind, sort, or description. It had, if Mr. Stubbs pleases to insist upon it, some small police functions; and it is possible that it may have had some sort of police-court, although even the existence of this court can hardly be proved. Mr. Stubbs cites one charter of Richard I. to show that the word "townshipmot" occurs at all. Mr. Stubbs further says that the township appears in its ecclesiastical form as the parish. But, on the other hand, the laws, the records, the constitution itself, and the whole literature of Germanic society leave no possible doubt as to what the English people considered their unit of constitutional machinery. It was the hundred, of which the township was a mere fraction or subdivision, with no separate activity of its own. The hundred-court, consisting of at least a certain number of freemen from every *vill*, and meeting every four weeks, was the foundation of everything in Anglo-Saxon history: of king, ealdorman, shire-court, army; of all except the Church. The hundred-court was the lowest court of civil and criminal jurisdiction; no complaint could be taken to the shire-court or to the king that had not been first heard in the hundred. It was the lowest organization used by the king for judicial or administrative purposes. Even so late an authority as Henry I. shows that the hundred at that day was still the unit of constitutional machinery as it was in the time of

the Saxon kings: "Henricus rex .... omnibus baronibus suis. —— Sciatis quod concedo et præcipio ut amodo comitatus mei *et hundreda* in illis locis et eisdem terminis sedeant, sicut sederunt in tempore regis Eadwardi et non aliter. Ego enim quando voluero, faciam ea satis summonere propter mea dominica necessaria ad voluntatem meam. .... Et volo et præcipio ut omnes de comitatu eant ad comitatus et hundreda, sicut fecerunt in tempore regis Eadwardi." Mr. Stubbs himself cites ample evidence to the same effect. The entire fabric of civic society, as described by Mr. Stubbs, testifies to the same fact. The very construction of Domesday Book and the Rotuli Hundredorum proclaims it.

If this were a point of secondary consequence, there would be no occasion to comment upon it. But if the clew offered by the hundred is once lost, or even if it is loosely held, the entire history of the English judicial constitution becomes a confused jumble of words. The one permanent Germanic institution was the hundred. The one code of Germanic law was hundred-law, much of which is now the common law of England. The hundred and its law survived all the storms which wrecked dynasties and Witan. It was the foundation of the judicial constitution under the Conqueror as it had been under Cnut and Alfred. Nor is this principle contradicted by the fact that the Conqueror, like Charlemagne, and perhaps too like Alfred, Cnut, and Edward the Confessor, occasionally sent special judges to hear special cases in these courts, and to decide them by the royal, equitable procedure, which substituted the *inquisitio per testes* for the oath and ordeal. Excepting the royal equitable jurisdiction, hundred-law was the sole law of England. The Conqueror, however, in an unlucky moment, allowed the archbishops and archdeacons to withdraw from the hundred-court all cases involving the Church, and to decide them in ecclesiastical courts, *non secundum hundret sed secundum canones*, not by hundred but by canon law. But neither William I. nor his sons, nor Stephen, nor even Henry II., made any essential change in the judicial constitution. The Assize of Clarendon merely shows the more regular and developed use of a power which seems to have been exercised by Alfred nearly three centuries before. The introduction into the judicial procedure of those new forms of proof which were to exclude the oath and the ordeal proceeded, as Glanvil says, from the highest equity, but was hardly in itself a revolution in the old constitution. The real change came when the king's judges, who had hitherto been chiefly bishops and sheriffs, and had sat in the county or hundred courts, began to form a professional class, and by means of their equitable powers drew suits before a court of their

own. Thus their jurisdiction gradually overlay the old hundred-jurisdiction and sucked the blood from it; but even then the hundred died slowly, inch by inch, peacefully, and without a moment of cessation in the continuity of English law. One of the best paragraphs in Mr. Stubbs's book describes the result: —

"The fixing of the Common Pleas at Westminster broke up the unity of the Curia, but it was not until the end of the reign of Henry III. that the general staff was divided into three distinct and permanent bodies of judges, each under its own chief. But the court or courts thus organized must no longer be regarded as the last resource of suitors. The reservation of knotty cases to be decided by the king with the council of his wise men, continues the ancient personal jurisdiction of the sovereign. The very act that seems to give stability and consistency to the ordinary jurisdiction of the Curia, reduces it to a lower rank. The judicial supremacy of the king is not limited or fettered by the new rule; it has thrown off an offshoot, or, as the astronomical theorists would say, a nebulous envelope, which has rolled up into a compact body, but the old nucleus of light remains unimpaired. The royal justice, diffused through the close personal council, or tempered and adapted by royal grace and equity under the pen of the chancellor, or exercised in the national assembly as in the ancient witenagemots, or concentrated in the hands of an irresponsible executive in the Star Chamber, has for many generations and in many various forms to assert its vitality, unimpaired by its successive emanations."

Yet, notwithstanding this great development of royal justice, the old hundred-jurisdiction long retained vitality, and especially in the form of manorial courts has retained it down to our own time. The manorial jurisdiction has given rise to much confusion of ideas. It is perhaps popularly supposed that, under Norman influence, the manor court created a new and peculiar kind of law in England; that it wrung sovereignty from the Crown and their liberties from the people, and set up a legal system of its own. On this point again Mr. Stubbs is not so clear as one would wish. He neither states the nature and extent of manorial jurisdiction in England with all the preciseness possible, nor compares it with that in France and Germany, nor does he even declare any very decided opinion as to its historical origin. Indeed, on this point he returns to what has been above criticised as a very hazardous opinion in regard to the township. Starting apparently from the former assumption that the township was the unit of constitutional machinery, he quotes Ordericus to the effect that the manor was merely the ancient township now held by a feudal lord, and then adds: "The manorial constitution is the lowest form of judicial organization. . . . . Every manor had a court-baron, the ancient gemot of the township,

. . . . and a court customary." Possibly Mr. Stubbs may be right, but it would be extremely interesting to know on what evidence he rests his assertion that the court-baron was the ancient gemot of the township. Surely the charter of Richard I., already referred to, is not all the evidence he has to offer on this point, though it is all that is furnished. On the other hand, Mr. Stubbs knows better than any one else, and intimates in various places that the jurisdiction of the court-baron, which is certainly the true object of interest, was not the jurisdiction of the township-gemot, but of the hundred. Almost in the next line to that above quoted, he goes on to say that certain manors "had also a court-leet or criminal jurisdiction cut out, as it were, from the criminal jurisdiction of the hundred." If the criminal jurisdiction of the manorial court came from the hundred, Mr. Stubbs ought at least to have said where the civil jurisdiction came from. Certainly not from the township. Undoubtedly both civil and criminal jurisdiction came from the hundred, for the simple reason that there was no other source from which it could have come. Every legal authority has always assumed it to be hundred-jurisdiction. Scroggs and Scriven, Gneist, even Mr. Stubbs himself, are in accord on this point. At least Mr. Stubbs, on the following page, says in a note that the jurisdiction of the hundreds fell more especially into the hands of the territorial proprietors, whose courts "were in fact, as they had been earlier, public jurisdictions vested in private hands."

The manorial court, as known in the later law, was a private hundred; its jurisdiction was the same, its constitution the same, its procedure the same, as those of the hundred. The continuity of history requires that this point should be strongly asserted. By confusing manorial jurisdiction with the jurisdiction of some unknown village police-court, the logical development of the judicial constitution is seriously disturbed. No one would for an instant suppose that Mr. Stubbs is ignorant of the facts, but there is a certain vagueness in his modes of expression which sometimes leaves the reader in the dark as to his actual opinion, and on a capital point like this no historian can afford to be vague. Too much stress cannot be laid on the fact that manorial jurisdiction was in its origin and essence hundred jurisdiction; unless, indeed, the author believes that it was not hundred jurisdiction, and in that case too much stress cannot be laid on the negative. The mere fact that the popular court was at one period presided over by an elected officer, at another by a royal official, and at a third by a lord of the manor, makes no difference in the legal character of the institution. Whatever happened in France, it would be hard to prove that any baron ever wrung one attribute of sover

eignty from the grasp of the Norman kings. The manorial courts after, as before, the conquest, were but private hundred-courts, in which, not the lord, but the freemen declared the law, and such they have ever remained. The chain which unites our modern judicial constitution with that of Alfred the Great is perfect in its more archaic as in its more royal sequence.

This notice has already exceeded its proper limits, and there is no space left for examining Professor Stubbs's treatment of the great ecclesiastical questions in which he is peculiarly at home. But perhaps a critic may be allowed to express regret that he is not to have the assistance of Professor Stubbs's great knowledge and judgment in regard to one point which is of some interest to specialists. An active controversy has for years occupied much attention in Germany on the relative merits of the two characteristically Germanic or modern systems of judicial machinery, — that of the jury, and that of the Echevins, Schöffen, or Scabini. English historians have hitherto been so exclusively interested in their own jury system as to show little interest in that other procedure which was once its rival. Yet there are indications which suggest that even in England the older institution may have been for a long period in active existence. Mr. Stubbs does indeed call attention to the fact that in the twelfth century justice appears to have been administered in the shire-court by a distinct class of freemen who were bound by oath to the honest performance of their duties. He points out that there was a very numerous body of men, distinct from the ordinary members of the court, upon whom the duty fell of acting as *judices* or *juratores*, and whose fines for neglect of that duty fill the Pipe Roll of Henry I. "The judges and jurors of Yorkshire owe a hundred pounds that they may no more be judges or jurors"; and so in a number of other cases. Mr. Stubbs is, however, very cautious in expressing an opinion as to the precise functions of these judges and jurors. That at so early a time they could have had little in common with modern jurors, is obvious. But the same class of men seems to be meant by the paragraph in the so-called Laws of Henry I.: "Regis judices sunt barones comitatus qui liberas in eis terras habent, per quos debent causæ singulorum alterna prosecutione tractari." And their existence would seem to go back into Anglo-Saxon times, if any inference can be drawn from entries in Domesday like that in the Customs of Chester: "Tunc (tempore regis Edwardi) erant XII judices civitatis, et hi erant de hominibus regis et episcopi et comitis: horum si quis de hundred remanebat die quo sedebat, sine excusatione manifesta, X solidis emendabat inter

regem et comitem." To the same institution may possibly be traced the reference in the Consultum de Monticolis Walliæ, a document which is commonly ascribed to the age of Ethelred, but which Schmid inclines to refer to that of Athelstan or even earlier: "XII lahmen, i. e. legis homines debent rectum discernere Walis et Englis, VI Walisei et VI Anglici; et perdant omne quod suum est si injuste judicent, vel se adlegient quod rectius nescierunt." There may not be sufficient evidence to prove the adoption into the English constitution of the Frankish Schöffen system, but there is certainly enough to make it desirable that the point should be more thoroughly investigated, and its constitutional interest explained.

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13. — *Etruscan Researches.* By ISAAC TAYLOR. 8vo. pp. xii, 388. London: Macmillan & Co. 1874.

MR. TAYLOR does not overstate, in his first chapter, or "Prologue," the interest of the Etruscan problem. There is hardly another ethnological and linguistic question left which so presses for an answer. That there should have been a people of whose works and institutions, and language even, we know so much, a neighbor and rival during several centuries of that Latin-speaking race from which we derive our civilization, and itself a not unimportant contributor to that civilization, and that we should not know where to place it in the system of human races and languages, — this is a constant trial and mortification to the votaries of ethnology. It is a problem akin with that of the Basques, though not without important differences also. We are more readily content to accept the Basques as a relic of a Southwestern European population, dispossessed and almost crowded out of existence by the tribes of our own kindred when they spread themselves to cover European soil. But the Etruscans are a community dropped down, as it were, in a spot surrounded on all sides by peoples whom we know, and showing no signs of being older and more original than these; and there are traditions of their having come in from afar: how can it be impossible to connect them with some recognized division of the human race outside of Italy?

A question like this, of course, has not gone without finding many would-be answers. There are plenty of people in the world who can settle any matter, however difficult, of which the conditions are sufficiently indefinite and obscure. Mr. Taylor reports briefly some of the attempts made in this direction, and the results reached. There is hardly an existing or extinct race of men with whom the Etruscans